American Influence Podcast #25

Episode #25 : the CIA abuse story. It’s a good one.

Selling the US mission in Afghanistan

After eight years of US-led war in Afghanistan, president Obama will have his work cut out for him in persuading the American public that it’s worth it. Obama criticized the Bush administration for “doubling down” in Iraq. And that appears to be what US military commanders feel is needed to turn things around in Afghanistan.

Military analyst Anthony Cordesman has an op-ed in the Washington Post today that’s worth reading for its foreshadowing of the Obama pitch on Afghanistan. Cordesman writes about the Bush administration fouling things up there for years. And he says Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Amb. Karl Eikenberry are “our last hope for victory.” A question that the public and the news media will focus on, of course, is… how many more US troops will be needed? Cordesman throws out the following range: between 6,900 and 40,000.

“… almost every expert on the scene has talked about figures equivalent to three to eight more brigade combat teams — with nominal manning levels that could range from 2,300 to 5,000 personnel each — although much of that manpower will go to developing Afghan forces that must nearly double in size, become full partners rather than tools, and slowly take over from U.S. and NATO forces.”

Old rivalry, FBI vs. CIA

With all the speculation this week about how Barack Obama will deal with this whole CIA abuse conundrum, it’s easy to forget that these are two powerful agencies run by two powerful officials with their own priorities. The NYTimes has a great story today on the head-butting between Eric Holder and Leon Panetta. Former CIA official Paul Pillar helped explain some of the hard feelings at the nation’s top spy agency over the way the Justice Department is handling things. His voice will be in the next podcast episode.

Cheney’s torture claim debunked

Spencer Ackerman at the Washington Independent has been very busy today. Ackerman’s take on the documents released by the CIA on Monday – as requested by Cheney – actually show the opposite of what he said they would. Namely, that good intelligence was obtained from Al Qaeda suspects not through torture, but through non-abusive methods. That’s exactly what former CIA man Robert Baer told me today in an interview. Besides the moral questions about whether it’s right or not, he said torture simply doesn’t work.

Special prosecutor for CIA abuse

Those folks hoping for a full investigation into allegations of CIA prisoner abuse and torture of terrorism suspects during the Bush years might be disappointed with the appointment today of John Durham. As the Washington Post describes it, Durham’s task is s really more of an investigation to determine whether an investigation might be needed:

“… Durham’s mandate, the sources added, will be relatively narrow: to look at whether there is enough evidence to launch a full-scale criminal investigation of current and former CIA personnel who may have broken the law in their dealings with detainees. Many of the harshest CIA interrogation techniques have not been employed against terrorism suspects for four years or more.”

For my radio story today, I talked with former CIA officer Robert Baer. He’s very supportive of the idea of conducting a real outside investigation into CIA abuse. “It’s what civilized nations do,” he said.

During his 21 year CIA career, Baer told me he was invited to oversee the torture of detainees. But he said he refused. Why? Not because it was morally wrong, he said. But because torture doesn’t work.

“It’s ineffective,” Baer said. “People say anything to stop the torture.”

And we’re back

Back from vacation on this steamy Monday morning in Brighton… and tasked with the CIA abuse story.

Condolences

To those Red Sox fans who stayed up late last night to watch the 15th inning A-Rod homer. A line in today’s Globe story gets right to it:

“… Sox season veers dangerously off course.”

US kills Taliban leader in Pakistan

The US drone strike on Wednesday against Pakistani Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud appears to have worked. Mehsud was probably the most-wanted man in Pakistan. So, what does it mean for the US mission in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Who was (assuming he’s dead) Baitullah Mehsud?

In a recent interview with The World, Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid described Mehsud as a Taliban commander who successfully brought together some 40 militant groups in 2007 and then focused the brunt of their violent campaign against the Pakistani government. Mehsud is said to have ordered hundreds of suicide attacks that have killed something like two thousand people, including the one that killed former Pakitstani prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.

Rashid said he fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan during the civil war there in the 1990s. And then joined in the fight against the US after 2001. “He’s been around,” Rashid said. “He’s reportedly close to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.”

He’s charismatic and also incredibly ruthless, Rashid said, including against his own people. “It’s a mixture of terror and charisma,” Rashid said. But it’s because of his friendship with international terrorist leaders like bin Laden that Mehsud has been able to maintain such influence in parts of Pakistan.

Finally, Mehsud has talked about ordering attacks against the US. Would he have been able to pull it off? Rashid said, probably not.

Cordesman on Mehsud

If you’re looking for something in the way of military analysis to keep your attention away from work responsibilities this morning (and who isn’t?), read this. It’s the latest paper from influential military strategist Anthony Cordesman of the Center for International and Strategic Studies. The bottom line: funding of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is screwed up royally.

The most serious problem in the way the US has approached the funding of its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and one that may lead to its defeat in Afghanistan and failure to turn its tactical victories in Iraq into lasting strategic gains, is its underfunding of the war in Afghanistan, and its failures to develop in integrated civil-military plan and strategy in either war and to fund civil operations at the level required.

The Bush Administration did far more than fail to develop a meaningful approach to planning, programming, and budgeting its adventures in warfighting, it failed to use resources effectively at the grand strategic level. The Obama Administration has the opportunity to at least try to correct these failures, but it is still far from clear that is will do so.

So, I called up Cordesman this morning to talk about the probable killing of Pakistani Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud. And I asked him, if it’s true, what does it mean for the overall US mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here’s the interview:  //6:12